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Abstract—Microgrids (MGs) rely on networked control sup-
ported by off-the-shelf wireless communications. This makes
them vulnerable to cyber-attacks, such as denial-of-service (DoS).
In this paper, we mitigate those attacks by applying the concepts
of (i) separation of data plane from network control plane,
inspired by the software defined networking (SDN) paradigm,
and (ii) agile reconfiguration of the data plane connections.
In our architecture, all generators operate as either voltage
regulators (active agents), or current sources (passive agents),
with their operating mode being locally determined, according
the global information on the MG state. The software-defined MG
control utilizes the fact that, besides the data exchange on the
wireless channel, the power-grid bus can be used to create side
communication channels that carry control plane information
about the state of the MG. For this purpose, we adopt power
talk, a modem-less, low-rate, power-line communication designed
for direct current (DC) MGs. The results show that the proposed
software-defined MG offers superior performance compared to
the static MG, as well as resilience against cyber attacks.
Index Terms—power system security, distributed algorithms,
microgrids, power system reliability, secondary control.
I. INTRODUCTION
M ICROGRIDS (MGs) are key components in the emerg-ing distributed Smart Grid landscape. They are defined
as localized and self-sustainable clusters of Distributed Energy
Resources (DERs) and loads, interconnected via power distri-
bution network through power electronic converters (PECs)
[1]. Direct-current (DC) MGs are gaining popularity due to
absence of reactive power, synchronization issues, as well as
natural fit with emerging DC loads, energy storage systems
and renewable sources [2].
The widespread adoption of the MG paradigm is attributed
to the development of robust, secure, and non-supervised con-
trol systems, which are software-implemented and executed by
PECs [3]. Hence, PECs take on the role of control agents that
perform the local sampling of the grid state and the overall
MG regulation. The control performed by PECs is usually
hierarchically organized to distinguish among different objec-
tives [4]. Specifically, the MG control architecture consists of
three levels. The primary control is localized within the agent
and guarantees the MG stability, while the secondary/tertiary
control require cooperation among the agents in order to
restore the voltage and optimize the power flow, respectively.
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The cooperation among agents is supported by an external
communication network, which can experience delay and
packet loss, thereby deteriorating the MG operation. With
non-ideal links, the secondary/tertiary control operate in a
suboptimal regime. A possible solution is the adoption of
robust control schemes that are tolerant against communica-
tion delays and/or packet drops, cf. [5]. However, when the
communication network is attacked by e.g. Denial of Service
(DoS), the secondary/tertiary control fails [6]. In addition to
the poor adaptation to communication impairments, another
deficiency of existing MG control is the information security:
the increase of the number of attacks against big-scale power
systems raises a concern also about the cyber-resilience of the
small scale grids. In fact, even if the MG failure does not
lead to large blackouts, it may damage sensitive loads, such
as electronic equipment, or cause the tripping of DERs [7].
The concerns described above, as well as the possibility to
abstract the agents’ functionalities from the PECs’ hardware,
establish the motivation to redesign the multi-agent MG con-
trol towards a more reconfigurable and secure system. Unlike
the existing works, the role of each agent in our proposal is not
statically defined: thanks to software reconfiguration, a PEC
can operate as an active control agent as well as passively
act as a sensor that delegates the control to active agents.
The operation mode is selected according to the MG status
and to the status of the external communication network. The
resulting architecture, first introduced in [8], is inspired by
the concept of Software Defined Network (SDN) [9] that
allows agile reconfiguration of the communication system
due to function virtualization and data-control separation. We
therefore denote the proposed architecture as software-defined
MicroGrid control.
In the proposed architecture, the data plane contains the
actual information exchange between agents. The networking
control plane is used by the agents to monitor and improve the
links quality. In our framework, the two planes are physically
separated via the use of different communication interfaces:
wireless and power line communication (PLC), respectively.
As a PLC solution, we use power talk [10]-[11], a modem-
less low-rate signalling technique designed specifically for the
information exchange among controllers in a DC MG [12].
In this work, we enhance the operation of power talk with a
Carrier Sense Multiple Access (CSMA) protocol, optimized
for the use over this specific channel. We also propose an
algorithm for the dynamic selection of the active DERs (i.e.
agents), which is run in a distributed manner by the PECs,
relying on the information exchanged via power talk. We
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show the benefits of the dynamic agent selection, investigating
the scenarios in which there are dynamic changes in: (i) the
wireless data plane connectivity among DERs; and (ii) the
generated power within the MG.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the background and motivation for this work. Sec-
tion III introduces the system model. Section IV briefly
presents power talk communications. Section V contains the
description of the proposed architecture. Section VI verifies the
viability of the framework through a simulation implemented
in Simulink. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
A number of robust networked control systems for DC MGs
have emerged recently [13]. Besides the standard, centralized
approach that is inherited from large-scale power systems, a
distributed control implemented by multiple agents is a viable
solution that mitigates the single-point-of-failure problem and
increases the system modularity [1]. The distributed control
is typically based on consensus algorithm, which permits
the agents to converge to a global average using only the
information exchanges that are performed among, in com-
munication terms, neighboring agents [14], [5], [15]. Relying
on the broadcasting nature of the wireless medium, it was
observed that wireless solutions overcome standard wired
solutions in the support of gossip consensus algorithms, cf. [5].
Potential wireless solutions to be used in MGs are cellular net-
works [16], ZigBee [14], Wi-Fi [5], or their combinations [17],
where the choice depends on the MG extent, affordable cost,
and required Quality of Service. However, the adoption of
wireless technologies raises concerns regarding the reliability
and security of the control. In the following text, we present
two motivating problems that our framework aims to solve.
1) Selection of the active control agents: In a power grid,
the positioning of the wireless transceivers is constrained by
the physical location of the DERs, such that certain agents may
not be even able to establish communication to the rest of the
agents. This is illustrated in Fig. 1, where three communicating
subsets are present, namely U1, U2 and U3. Here U3 has a
single isolated agent, that can neither communicate to other
agents nor participate in the networked secondary/tertiary con-
trol. Furthermore, a static selection of active agents, adopted
in the state-of-art works, does not account for the cyber-
physical variations occurring in the MG, e.g., (i) variations
of the power generated by DERs, (ii) varying reliability of the
wireless channel and (iii) modifications of the communication
network graph. Therefore, the set of control agents should not
be statically defined, but they should be able to adapt their
control mode to the cyber-physical conditions of the MG.
2) Cyber-security: Employing off-the-shelf technologies,
e.g. ZigBee or Wi-Fi, exposes the networked control to com-
munication outages caused be external malicious entities, e.g.
Denial Of Service (DoS) attacks. Previous works [6] show that
a malicious attacker equipped with a jamming device can eas-
ily undermine the information exchange, causing the system
to converge to an erroneous voltage level. Leveraging on the
fact that the attacker is capable of jamming only a finite area,
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Fig. 1: Representation of a MG in which PECs are intercon-
nected by electrical bus (black connections) and communica-
tion links (dashed purple).
active DERs should be selected outside of its communication
range, to be able exchange control information.
The key observation that underlies this work is that, be-
sides the wireless network, DERs are interconnected by the
electrical distribution network, which can be used as a side
communication channel. This extra channel can bring the
required resilience and security to the MG operation. The side
channel is of a PLC nature; among the available PLC tech-
nologies, we adopt Power Line Signalling (PLS), which is a
communication technique that does not require the installation
of additional hardware, but relies on the PEC capabilities.
Specifically, we employ power talk [10]-[11], which can be
implemented as a simple upgrade of the PECs’ software. As
power talk provides a low-rate channel that is not capable of
sustaining the secondary control data traffic1, it is only used as
a side, secure, and resilient communication channel to perform
control-plane exchanges that complement the wireless data-
plane communication links.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
The scenario considered in this paper is a single-bus DC MG
in which a group of U DERs is deployed to increase the self-
sustainability of the installed load and to minimize the depen-
dency to the main grid. We index the DERs in U = {1, ...,U}
and model the load as resistive impedance with power demand
Pd . DERs are interfaced to the distribution network bus by
means of DC-DC PECs [3]. By PM = [P1,M, · · · , PU,M ] we
denote a vector that contains the maximum produced power,
or capacity, of each DER. We define the total generated power
as Pg =
∑
u∈U Pu,M .
In our model, PECs have the dual-mode capability [18]:
their software implements the logic of both Current Source
Control (CSC) and Voltage Source Control (VSC), and they
are able to switch between these operation modes seamlessly.
This feature permits to use the interfaced DER at its full
capacity when performing CSC, as well as to participate in
the voltage control when performing VSC. Also, a stand-alone
grid, such as an islanded MG, requires that a subset of DERs
V, V ∈ U and |V| = V > 0, performs VSC. This subset
1Note that the information required for the tertiary control can be exchanged
via power talk [12].
SUBMITTED TO IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SMART GRID (2018) 3
is called Voltage Source Set (VSS), where the set cardinality
depends on the capacity of the resources. The remaining U−V
DERs from the set U \V perform CSC, thus constituting the
passive agents of the network.
A. Voltage Source Control
The VSC is organized according to a hierarchical architec-
ture [4], composed of three levels.
1) Primary control: A droop loop accomplishes the current
sharing among the VSC units. The loop has a sampling/control
period Tpc and can be expressed at DER u as
vu = vref − ruiu, u ∈ V,
where vu and iu are the output voltage and current, vref is the
reference voltage and ru is the virtual resistance. The loop is
implemented by a PI controller with proportional parameter
Kpcp and integral parameter K
pc
i . This control loop depends
only on local measurements, which causes the bus voltage
deviations from the reference value vref.
2) Secondary control: A distributed secondary control is
in charge of (i) the restoration of the voltage to vref and (ii)
the proportional current sharing among generators [4], and is
based on the local estimation of the average voltage v¯u and
current i¯u in the MG. Among the multitude of distributed sec-
ondary control schemes [13], we adopt the solution proposed
in [19], which utilizes two compensation terms δxi and δxv
to balance the equation
v?u = vref + δx
i + δxv − ruiu, u ∈ V . (1)
Two PI controllers, characterized by proportional and integral
parameters Kscv,p, K
sc
v,i and K
sc
i,p, K
sc
i,i , respectively, generate the
correction terms according to:
δxi = i˜u − αu · V · i¯u, δxv = v˜u − v¯u, (2)
where
αu =
Pu,M∑V
v=0 Pv,M
. (3)
The scheme requires the global knowledge of PM , but im-
proves the one adopted in [8] by promoting the proportional
power sharing among VSC DERs. We compute the average
values through a robust broadcast gossiping [5], suitably
modified to include the proportional term αu . The algorithm
requires the synchronization among agents, being executed in
periods of duration T sc, which also determine the sampling
frequency of the secondary control. The secondary control
operation iterates through the following steps:
1) In secondary control period k, DER u ∈ V broadcasts a
packet to the neighboring control agents over the wireless
interface with payload au(k) = [v¯u(k), i¯u(k)], representing
the local estimates of the average voltage and current
measured by DERs, respectively.
2) During the same secondary control period k, DER u
receives R packets broadcasted from neighboring agents,
which are supplied as input to the robust broadcast gossip
algorithm:
au(k + 1) =
{
βumu(k) + (1 − βu)
∑
j a j (k)
R , R > 0
βumu(k) + (1 − βu)a′u(k), R = 0
where mu(k) = [v˜u(k), i˜u(k)] is the local measurement
vector in secondary control period k, aj(k) is the status
of agent j (assumed to be within the communication
range of agent u), a′u(k) = [0, i˜u(k)/(αu · V)] serves to
compensate (3) when information from neighbors is not
available and βu ∈ (0, 1) is the consensus weight for agent
u; in this paper we adopt that βu = V−1, ∀u ∈ V.
3) The new status au(k+1) is then forwarded to the local PI
controllers, together with the measurement vector mu(k).
4) The PI controllers generate the reference voltage correc-
tion signals δxi and δxv of (2).
In case of a load/generation change, the offsets δxi and δxv
converge to stable values when a global consensus is reached
by the described scheme. Note that the adopted broadcast
gossip consensus algorithm provides high robustness against
packet losses, see [5], because the local information is used
in absence of external one.
3) Tertiary control: The tertiary control is in charge of
the economic optimization, as well as the management of the
bidirectional power flow with the main grid. The information
exchange happens on lager time intervals, typically T tc = 5−30
minutes. For this reason, the communication requirements are
less demanding and, in this work, we don’t adopt a tertiary
control, but the proposed model can be easily extended. We
further assume that PM is constant over a tertiary control
period and that the demand is always satisfied, i.e. Pg > Pd .
B. Current Source Control
A PEC u that performs CSC permits the utilization of the
DER as a passive agent. The electrical model consists of a
current generator iu,M in parallel with an internal resistance
approximated by rd [18]. As opposed to VSC DERs, CSC
DERs do not participate in the active control and are excluded
from the broadcast gossip algorithm.
C. Communication System
Each DER is equipped with an IEEE 802.11 wireless
interface that supports the ad-hoc network mode, allowing
decentralized information exchange and multicast packet trans-
mission. The wireless interface is characterized by the com-
munication range ρ, see Fig. 1, which determines the set
of neighbors reachable by DER u, indicated with Nu . We
assume that the links are bidirectional, i.e. the communication
graph is undirected. Depending on the DERs positions and
ρ, the wireless network graph G may be split into ω ≥ 1
subgraphs, where the j-th graph is denoted by Gj , its set of
DERs by Uj , and ∪1≤ j≤ωUj = U. To ensure convergence of
the consensus algorithm, the graph connecting V should be
strongly connected, i.e., V ⊆ Uj for some j. The wireless
network traffic consists of packets containing information
required to run the secondary control, which are generated
by DER u ∈ V. Table I gives a comparison between existing
distributed secondary control schemes. Note that the number
of DERs is usually limited, and the secondary control traffic
has a duty cycle in the order of tens of milliseconds.
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TABLE I: Comparison of existing communication models for
distributed secondary control; n.d. means not declared.
Paper Traffic Network
T sc [ms] Packet size [bit] U Graph
[19] 100-1000 n.d. 6 Mesh, cross, ring, line
[5] 10 n.d. 4 Mesh
[6] 25 16 6 Mesh
[14] 50 ∼ 800 3 Mesh, directed
[8] 25 16 9 Random
[15] 20 n.d. 10 Mesh
Pd
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M
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M
M
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VSC CSC
Fig. 2: Representation of the power sharing among DERs.
D. Metrics
We use i∗v to denote the output current of VSC DER v ∈
V, in the ideal case when the grid voltage is vref. The sub-
optimality of the secondary control with respect to the ideal
case is expressed as the sum of the deviations of the output
current of VSC DERs with respect to the corresponding i∗v:
Jsc =
∑
v∈V
|iv − i∗v |. (4)
We define Jcq as the quality of specific selection of VSC set.
In general, Jcq can depend both on physical properties, such
as the generation capacity, as well as cyber aspects, i.e. the
wireless network graph connectivity or communication cost.
We define Jcq as the probability that the power demand is
lower than the CSC DERs’ production, i.e. the probability
that VSC DERs are absorbing energy:
Jcq = Prob
Pd <
∑
u∈U\V
Pu
 . (5)
The above definition requires knowledge of the demand statis-
tics, which can be modeled as Gaussian [20], i.e. Pd ∼
N(µ, σ2). Then, we have:
Jcq = 1 −Q(x), x =
∑
u∈U\V Pu − µ
σ
(6)
where Q(x) is the Q-function.
E. Selection of Voltage Source Controllers
Different choices of DERs in V lead to different Jsc and
Jcq, making necessary the formulation of a proper selection
algorithm for the VSC set. As illustrated in Fig. 2, the set
cardinality, V , should allow to meet the variations of demand:
if too small, the VSC DERs may have to absorb energy; on the
other hand, the inclusion of all DERs in V increases the com-
munication cost and reduces the DER utilization efficiency.
Furthermore, as discussed in Section II, possible choices of
VSCs are constrained by the cyber network topology, i.e. all
VSCs should be in the same, strongly connected, subset. The
objective that we set is to find the connected set of DERs with
lowest cardinality that gives
Jcq < pabs, (7)
where 0 ≤ pabs ≤ 1 is the highest allowed probability of the
event in which VSC DERs have to absorb power. If there is no
solution to (7), we select the connected graph that provides the
lowest Jcq, to ensure that the algorithm always gives solution.
Leveraging on the fact that in a typical scenario the set of
DERs has low cardinality, see Table I, we propose Alg. 1. This
is an exhaustive algorithm that builds an ordered collection L
of all connected graphs, then selects the one that satisfies the
selection conditions. The connectivity of graph connecting a
generic set of DERs, W, can be verified, for instance, by
means of the well-known Tarjan’s algorithm [21].
Algorithm 1 VSC set selector
input PM, GU
V ← ∅, V ′← ∅, pˆ← 1, L← ⋃
{W:W∈U, |W |≤V }
W
for W in L do
if W is not connected then
L← L\W
else
p← Jcq(PM,GW)
if p ≤ pˆ then
pˆ← p, V ′←W
if p ≥ pabs then
L← L\W
if |L| > 0 then
V ← L[0]
output V
IV. POWER TALK
Power talk is a communication technique implemented
within the primary control loops of the PECs [12]. The
principle idea is to send information over the power grid buses
by varying the droop control parameters of VSC DERs; in
this paper, we focus on the scenario where the information is
conveyed only through the variations of the reference voltage
vref. These variations cause the variations of the steady state
voltage that is observed by other PECs. We note that, in order
to deviate the steady state voltage, the secondary control has
to be temporary suspended in the grid during the signalling
periods of power talk. In principle, power talk can use any
modulation scheme [10] and channel coding. In this paper, we
adopt a binary modulation, with symbol period Tpt, amplitude
apt, and no channel coding, cf. [10]-[11]. The observations of
the transmitted symbols periods are with a lag of τ seconds,
in order allow the bus to reach a steady state after vref has
been deviated [22].
A. Power-Talk Communication Protocol
We assume that signalling via power talk is performed
periodically, through a power talk channel (PTCh) that is
established in intervals of duration TPTCh seconds. As already
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Wireless interface
Power Talk interface
𝑇tc  
𝑇sc  
𝑇PTCh  𝑇e  
Secondary control traffic Time
PTCh
Fig. 3: Time relationship between power talk and wireless
interfaces.
noted, the secondary control is suspended during the PTCh,
and, thus, TPTCh should be as short as possible. The PTCh’s
are triggered with a constant period: this permits to coordinate
the VSC DERs in the suspension of the secondary control and
keeps the design complexity low. In order to enable plug-and-
play capability of the MG, here we enhance power talk with a
Carrier Sense Multiple Access (CSMA) scheme. This enables
random access to the shared channel, while keeping the time
in which the communication system is idle low. Specifically, a
CSMA protocol coordinates DER transmissions during TPTCh.
The protocol is characterized by the carrier sensing duration,
or virtual slot, σs, that is chosen based on the propagation
delay in the grid. The channel access operates as follows.
At the beginning of each PTCh period, each DER sets an
internal counter to a uniformly randomly selected number in
[0, B − 1], where B ∈ N is a design parameter. The counter
is decremented for each idle virtual slot, σs, and, when it
reaches zero, the DER starts the transmission. When a DER
starts transmitting, the others stop decrementing their counter
for the duration of a transmission, Tdt, that is known a priori. In
case of a collision, when more than one DER selects the same
number of slots, the corresponding DERs do not retransmit.
Instead, they keep the collision probability in a PTCh to be
below a low target value through the appropriate selection of
B, as described in the following section.
V. THE SOFTWARE-DEFINED CONTROL ARCHITECTURE
To demonstrate the advantages of the proposed software-
defined control architecture, in the following text we present
the potential application of decentralized voltage sources set
selection.
A. Decentralized Voltage Sources Set Selection (DVSSS)
The operation of MGs is subject to variations in the gener-
ated power, wireless connectivity among the agents, due to e.g.
wireless jamming from malicious agents, and grid topology,
such as addition/removal of DERs and loads. Thus, Alg. 1
should be run periodically, e.g., every tertiary control period,
in order to determine the current optimal set of VSC DERs
V. Due to the lack of centralized coordination, this should
be done in a decentralized manner: DERs receive updated
information about DERs’ power capacity and connectivity, PM
and G, execute Alg. 1 and thereby set their control mode.
Wireless interface
Power Talk
Neighbors 
discovery
Contention phase Contention-free phase
PTCh
𝑇𝑐  𝑇𝑐𝑓  
𝑇𝑑  
Fig. 4: Wireless and power talk channel as seen by DER u
during DVSSS messages exchange. Information transmitted
by u is coloured in red.
The scheme, indicated as decentralized voltage sources set
selection (DVSSS), is executed periodically and consists of
the following steps, represented in Fig. 4:
1) All DERs activate the wireless interface and broadcast
short, control plane packets for Td seconds. This step
is required to notify their presence and obtain the list
of their potential neighbors (neighbors discovery phase),
and is executed Td seconds before the beginning of the
power talk channel (PTCh).
2) DERs broadcast the information about their neighbors
and generation capacity over the power talk interface.
3) Each of them locally executes Alg. 1.
4) If DER u ∈ V, then activate the VSC, tuning the
consensus algorithm according to (3); otherwise activate
the CSC and do not transmit over the wireless channel
until the next subset selection.
For simplicity, the DVSSS is run in every tertiary control
period, T tc. The PTCh, used for control plane exchanges, is
established with the same periodicity, i.e., every Te = T tc
seconds, and its duration, TPTCh seconds, is divided in two
phases. The first one is a CSMA-based contention phase of
duration Tc seconds, in which DERs notify their presence,
operation required to permit addition/removal of DERs. The
second phase is contention-free and of duration Tcf seconds,
in which each DER u broadcasts the lists of its wireless
neighbours Nu . The total duration is:
TPTCh = Tc + Tcf. (8)
During Tc, each DER u contends the channel by means of the
described CSMA protocol, and broadcasts a b−bit packet that
contains its own ID and Pu,M . The duration of Tc depends
on (i) the CSMA parameters σs and B, (ii) pc, defined as
the probability that all U DERs choose a different counter
value B and there are no collisions, and (iii) the probability
that all agents attempt the transmission before Tc. We require
that pc > p?c , where p
?
c is a target probability, and all DERs’
counters value reach zero before Tc, which certainly happens
if the number of idle virtual slots, Nb , is greater than B. These
two conditions are, respectively:
pc =
B!/(B −U)!
BU
> p?c , Nb =
⌈
Tc −U · Tdt
σs
⌉
≥ B, (9)
where Tdt = b · Tpt + τ is the duration of the transmission of
one DER and τ is a guard time to account for the network
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Fig. 5: The case study MG. (a) Electrical scheme of the power
talk communication network. The arrow up represents a load,
the arrow down a DER. (b) Spatial position of DERs. The
dashed lines are wireless communication links.
TABLE II: Simulation parameters.
Communication and algorithm parameters
ρ 175 m T d 10 s pabs 0.01
Power talk parameters
σs 0.003 s b 8 bits T pt 0.01 s
apt 0.5 V
Control parameters
T pc 10−4 s T sc 10−2 s rd 0.385
Kscv,p 0.1 K
sc
v, i 20 K
sc
i,p 0.1
Ksci, i 20 K
pc
p 3 K
pc
i 170
Electrical parameters
vref 380 V CDC 2.2 · 10−3 F µ 14.44 kW
σ2 1.44 kW pmin 1 kW pmax 4 kW
propagation delay. If we use U from the previous period, and
fix a target p?c , we can find B and Tc.
At the end of the contention period, DERs have the infor-
mation about U as well as an ordered list of DERs’ IDs. In
the contention-free phase, each DER access the channel in a
token-based manner, where the token passing follows the list
of IDs. The duration of this phase is simply
Tcf = b · Tpt · e +U · τ, (10)
where e is the number of edges of the network graph, while
U · τ stands for the addition of one guard interval per DER.
VI. RESULTS
The proposed framework is verified through numerical
simulation of a case-study DC MG with vref = 380 V and
U = 9 DERs, which is isolated from the main grid at the point
of common coupling (PCC). The overall electrical system,
represented in Fig. 5(a), is inspired by [15]. Here we also
take into account the relative positions of the DERs, see
Fig. 5(b), where a wireless communication link (depicted
in blue) between two DERs exists only if they are in the
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Fig. 6: Realization of the process when the wireless network
graph G is (a) stable and (b) split due to a DoS attack.
communication range ρ of each other. Further, the capacity
CDC models the cumulative capacities of DERs’ output filters.
The MG, parametrized as in Table II, is implemented in a
MATLAB/Simulink simulator.
1) PTCh duration: The propagation delay observed in the
grid is τ = 2.8 ms, and is used to set the value of σs. In the
next step, we fix p?c = 0.8 and solve (9), obtaining B = 165
and Tc = 1.24 s. For U = 9, a full-mesh graph has e = 36
edges, and we use these values to solve (10) and obtain Tcf =
2.91. Finally, we set the duration of PTCh in our simulation
as TPTCh = Tc + Tcf = 1.24 + 2.91 = 4.15 s.
2) Static Vs Dynamic set selection in case of DoS attacks:
We initially assume that set of VSC DERs is V = {1, 2, 4, 5},
that form a strongly connected graph. In each tertiary con-
trol period, the capacity of DERs is selected uniformly in
[pmin, pmax], with values reported in Table II. In Fig. 6, we
report voltage measured at PCC and currents measured by
DERs, during a simulation with duration 3T tc. In the middle
of each tertiary control period, a random load variation is
triggered, to show the system adaptation to the load change.
Initially, the VSC set is static and connected, see Fig. 6(a),
the power injection is proportionally shared among DERs and
the voltage is kept at the reference value vref. Fig. 6(b) shows
the case when communication of DER 2 is jammed by an
external attacker and VSC communication graph is split in
two sub-sets {1, 4, 5} and {2}, resulting in unbalanced power
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TABLE III: Comparison of metrics. (a) corresponds to the
simulation of Fig. 6 and (b) to the one of Fig. 7.
(a)
Iteration Jcq J sc [A]
1 2.5 × 10−3 0
2 1.3 × 10−3 0
3 3.3 × 10−4 0
(b)
Iter. Jcq J sc [A]
1 2.5 × 10−3 9.28
2 1.3 × 10−3 9.60
3 3.3 × 10−4 4.80
sharing. In particular, observe that DER 2 becomes isolated
and prevented to participate to the consensus, injecting more
current than required and causing the other three VSC DERs
to compensate the error. We report in Table III the value of
the metrics that express the secondary control sub-optimality
and quality, respectively Jsc ampere and Jcq at the beginning
of a tertiary control period, when the steady state is reached.
Table III(a), that corresponds to the simulation of Fig. 6(a),
shows that the secondary control cost is Jsc = 0 in each
period, since iv = i?v , ∀v ∈ V. Table III(b) corresponds to the
simulation of Fig. 6(b), and shows how the graph split reflects
in a positive Jsc. The results clearly motivate the need of a
dynamic selection algorithm for the DERs’ operating mode.
Fig. 7 reports the simulation of the same process when
we apply the proposed DVSSS algorithm. The VSC set,
V = {1, 2, 4, 5}, is split by the attacker, but the information ex-
change over PTCh permits the execution of DVSSS algorithm
and the establishment of a new connected set V = {1, 4, 5, 7},
excluding DER 2 from the active controllers and restoring
the wireless network connectivity. In the second iteration of
the DVSSS, a new set V = {3, 6, 8} is established, since
it provides the lowest Jcq in that tertiary control period.
Compared to Fig. 6(b), the algorithm reduces the cost Jsc to
zero in each iteration as well as decreases Jcq to 1.7 × 10−4,
5.7 × 10−4, 1.9 × 10−6. The figure also shows a sample of the
period when power talk takes place, which includes a CSMA
phase of duration Tc and a contention-free phase of duration
Tcf.
3) DVSSS and control quality improvement: In this sce-
nario, the wireless network graph G is composed of ω ≥ 1
static subgraphs, and the vector of generated power, PM , is
stochastic. We run Alg. 1 over 1000 realizations of PM . In
Fig. 8(a) we show a histogram of the sets selected by different
iterations of the algorithm, depending on PM , and in Fig. 8(b)
the probability that Jcq is lower than a target value x, obtained
by the DVSSS and by the static selection. The results show that
a dynamic selection provides an increased system reliability
with respect to the cost function Jcq, because Jcq is lower
than pabs in 99.9% of the cases. Secondly, we observe that
there are cases in which the static selection outperforms the
dynamic selection: the reason is that Alg. 1 selects the set with
lowest cardinality that provides the target Jcq, which is not
necessarily the one that provides the lowest Jcq. Finally, it is
interesting to observe that, thanks to the presence of the power
talk interface, the algorithm does not always select the VSC set
in the subgraph Uω = {1, 2, 4, 5, 7}, but also in Uω = {3, 6, 8}.
Finally, we verify that the proposed DVSSS improves Jcq
in general, by simulating random wireless network topologies,
while keeping the same electrical parameters. For each G, that
is not necessarily connected, we create 1000 realizations of
PM and power demand Pd and then compare the statistics of
DVSSS compared to a static system; for the static selection
we usedV that is the most frequently occurring in the DVSSS
case. We generate 20 graphs according to this procedure
(graph labeled with 1 is the one of Fig. 5(b)) and report
a boxplot in Fig. 9 that indicates median value, lower and
upper quartiles and outlier values (outside the upper quartile)
of Jcq. The figure shows that the proposed algorithm improves
the statistics of Jcq, by finding sets VSC sets that provide
Jcq < pabs in most of the cases, except for the case labeled
with 17. The reason is that this graph is split in 4 subgraphs,
limiting the possible solutions of Alg. 1, and making the
consensus-based control ineffective. The occurrence of this
graph warrants further investigation what kind of topologies
should be used in order to avoid vast inefficiency.
VII. CONCLUSION
Motivated by the limitations of the state-of-art distributed
secondary control schemes, we have presented a new cyber-
pysical architecture tailored for DC MG and exploiting the
communication potential residing in the MG electrical equip-
ment. We have shown that the proposed framework improves
the security (robustness against DoS attacks) and control
quality (selection of a VSCs set that optimizes a pre-defined
metric). Its cost, quantified as the duration of suspension of
the secondary control to permit the information exchange over
power talk, is kept low by sending a minimal amount of
information over this interface. Furthermore, this framework
promotes the active participation of the MG control in the
management of the supporting communication network: the
wireless network graph and the control mode are jointly
adapted according to the control/communication variations. As
a future work, it is interesting to study the topologies that can
benefit most from dynamic reconfiguration and based on that,
create suitable recommendations for topology deployment,
both for the electrical and the wireless part.
Finally, the proposed architecture is sufficiently general to
support additional applications. For example, the information
sent over the data plane, i.e., the wireless network, can be
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Fig. 9: Boxplots representing the statistics of Jcq in case of
(a) static configuration of V and (b) when DVSSS is used.
encrypted, and the encryption keys be exchanged over the
network control plane, to make the data plane traffic decodable
only by the PECs, which are the intended users. This implies
that MG control layer is not delegating the task of securing
the information to the communication interface, but actively
contributes to the improvement of the security.
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